

## XENOPHON AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY\*

The purpose of this paper is to consider those passages of Xenophon that illustrate certain fundamental doctrines of Athenian democratic thought, to determine the extent to which his views represent the norm, and to highlight any features that may betoken originality. It should, however, be noted at the outset that a number of the basic principles involved, particularly those that concern proper and improper relationships between the individual citizen and the community, are not exclusive to Athens or to democracy. Appropriately modified where necessary, they also occur in the little evidence we have for other cities and other forms of constitution. Therefore attention will be given in what follows to what Xenophon says not only about Athens but also about Sparta and the semi-mythical Persia of *Cyropaedia*.

### 1. SOLIDARITY AND SUBORDINATION

The most basic demand made by the city on the individual citizen is that he should at all times manifest his solidarity with the interests, preoccupations, and aspirations of the civic community as a whole.<sup>1</sup> The bad citizen, on the other hand, is isolated from the mass of the people in his pursuit of selfish interests that are at best irrelevant, at worst inimical to those of the city.<sup>2</sup>

Xenophon's Socrates is well aware of what is required. If you want to be honoured, he says to Glaucon, you must benefit the city (*M.* 3.6.3). There follows a lengthy discussion of how this might best be done and the knowledge and skills that are needed.<sup>3</sup> But his Cyrus insists (and the qualification deserves emphasis) that such benefits should not go unrecognized: the man who does the community most good should have the greatest rewards (*C.* 2.2.20).

In Xenophon the military sphere bulks large.<sup>4</sup> The rules for military service by citizens, metics, and other foreigners recommended in *Poroi* are all designed to enhance the benefit to the city (*P.* 2.1ff.). Phylarchs should realize that in the eyes of the city it is far more glorious for them to win credit for the appearance of the men of their tribe than simply for their own personal turnout (*Hipp.* 1.22), while victory in war is more glorious than in boxing, for the gods crown cities for success in war (*Hipp.* 8.7). A cavalry commander, says Socrates, will want to make the city's cavalry better and, if cavalry are needed, to be the author of some good to the city at its head (*M.* 3.3.2, cf. 4).

Not only the ordinary citizen but the good leader, be he king or prominent

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. R. Seager in F. C. Jaher (ed.), *The Rich, the Well Born, and the Powerful* (Urbana, 1973), 15, and the sources there cited.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Seager (n. 1), 15–16, and the sources there cited.

<sup>3</sup> J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London, 1974), 24.

<sup>4</sup> J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London and New York, 1995), 28ff. Apart from the passages cited in the text, cf. also *Hier.* 2.15, *C.* 1.5.7.

democratic politician, should regard the common weal as paramount.<sup>5</sup> It is the duty of the good ruler, as Cyrus is told by his father, to see that his subjects have all they need in abundance and that they are the kind of men they should be (*C.* 1.6.7). A similar view is attributed to Agesilaus, who believed that a good king should do his subjects as much good as possible (*Ag.* 7.1). Socrates, though he had no desire to rule, is credited with sentiments akin to those of Cyrus' father, though in a democratic context. Speaking of the Thirty, he maintained that any *prostates* who made the citizens fewer and worse was a bad one (*M.* 1.2.32), and in his view the greatest deceit was falsely to persuade men that one was capable of leading the city when in fact one was worthless (*M.* 1.7.5).

Xenophon defends Socrates on these criteria.<sup>6</sup> Socrates, he claims, never brought upon the city war, stasis, betrayal, or any other misfortune (*M.* 1.2.63). Socrates' own awareness of the relevance of such issues is shown by his advice to Xenophon to consult the Delphic oracle before joining Cyrus' expedition, since friendship with Cyrus might provoke criticism from the city because of the Persian's services to Sparta (*A.* 3.1.5). More dubious is the defence put forward by Alcibiades' friends, who claimed that circumstances had prevented him from showing his solidarity. He had always increased the common weal, whereas his enemies had sought only their own profit from public life. But he had been forced to cultivate his enemies and because of his exile had been unable to help the city (*H.* 1.4.13, 15). At his trial Theramenes makes a desperate attempt to reconcile the interests of the city and the Thirty in defence of his own policies. He had opposed the disarming of the people, he says, because he did not want to make the city weak—too weak to help the Thirty's friends in Sparta (*H.* 2.3.41).<sup>7</sup>

Spartans too practise to benefit the city with all their might if need be (*L.P.* 4.5). The most striking example is, of course, Agesilaus.<sup>8</sup> He did not hesitate to go out as an ambassador rather than as a general, if this was likely to benefit the city (*Ag.* 2.25). After securing the friendship of the king of Egypt he sailed home in the depth of winter with the money he had raised to make sure that the city would not be idle against its enemies in the following summer (*Ag.* 2.31). He chose always to fight against the strongest enemies, both for the city and for Greece (*Ag.* 6.1), and when he thought that he could benefit his country, he did not shirk toil, danger, or expense, and did not plead ill health or old age (*Ag.* 7.1). He told the king of Persia that there was no point in offering friendship to him personally; if the king showed himself friendly to Sparta and Greece, then Agesilaus would be his loyal friend, but if not, then nothing would win him over (*Ag.* 8.3).<sup>9</sup> Even in death he still benefited the city for which he had done so much in life (*Ag.* 11.16).

A more elaborate statement of the fields in which the good citizen should benefit the city is made by Socrates at *M.* 4.6.14: in financial affairs he makes the city more prosperous, in war stronger than its enemies; on embassies he turns enemies into

<sup>5</sup> Contrast the selfish motivation of the tyrant. He may, says Simonides, try to make his city great, but only because to increase his city is to reinforce his own power (*Hier.* 11.13).

<sup>6</sup> On Xenophon's defence of Socrates in relation to that of Plato, see J. de Romilly, *La loi dans la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1971), 120ff.

<sup>7</sup> On Xenophon and Theramenes, see Dillery (n. 4), 142ff.; on Theramenes's speech, *ibid.*, 154–5.

<sup>8</sup> For his solidarity, see *Ag.* 7.3: he thought that no citizen of Sparta was his enemy.

<sup>9</sup> G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge, 1987), 46–7; L. G. Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts* (Cambridge, 1997), 122ff., 187–8 (and 111ff. on Greeks and Persians in general).

friends, and as an orator quells stasis and promotes concord. However, the priority of the city's financial interests may be more cynically expressed. Charmides says that now he is poor he is like a tyrant, whereas when he was rich he was a slave. Before, he paid tribute to the demos; now the city keeps him (*S.* 4.32, cf. 45).<sup>10</sup> An equally pragmatic explanation of such civic devotion (though here the primacy of the city may work to the citizen's advantage) is offered in *Cynegeticus*, where Xenophon remarks that all those who benefit their cities and their friends take thought for their private affairs, for these flourish or fall along with the city (*Cyn.* 12.10–11, cf. 15). This perception is by no means unique: Thucydides puts it into the mouth of Nicias (*Thuc.* 6.9.2), while Plato seeks to inculcate such an attitude in the guardians (*Pl. Rep.* 412D–E).

More significant perhaps is Xenophon's mention of friends along with cities.<sup>11</sup> It is striking that he often takes what appears a more traditional view, which makes greater allowance for the claims of the individual, his reputation, family, and friends, than is customary in democratic discourse.<sup>12</sup>

*Memorabilia* offers several instances. Xenophon remarks that various men associated with Socrates so that they could learn how to treat their households, slaves, relations, friends, city, and fellow-citizens (*M.* 1.2.48). Several pieces of advice vouchsafed by Socrates are duly recorded. A man who desires to be honoured in a city, he says to Critobulus, will want to be able to avoid suffering injustice, to give just assistance to his friends, and as a magistrate to do some good to his country (*M.* 2.6.25, cf. 26).<sup>13</sup> To Pericles he commends actions which, if successfully accomplished, will be honourable for him and good for the city and, even if they fail, will bring neither harm to the city nor shame upon himself (*M.* 3.5.28). He also rebukes Charmides for his reluctance to engage in public life. A man who is capable of winning athletic contests and so winning honour for himself and making his country more glorious in Greece is a coward if he does not do so, and so is a man who does not, when he could, benefit the city and so win honour for himself by taking part in public life, which is his duty as a citizen (*M.* 3.7.1–2).<sup>14</sup>

Similar sentiments are voiced by speakers in other works. Antisthenes sees it as a regrettable paradox that courage and wisdom can sometimes be damaging to one's friends and city (*S.* 3.4). A man, says Socrates, should think by his courage to benefit his friends, enhance his city by setting up trophies over its enemies, and so to become renowned among both Greeks and barbarians (*S.* 8.38). Cyrus believes that men who practise the arts of war think to gain prosperity and to invest both themselves and the city with great honours (*C.* 1.5.9). The cavalry commander should pray to exercise his office as gloriously and beneficially as possible for himself, his friends, and the city (*Hipp.* 1.1). He and his men will fight for the city, for glory, and their lives (*Hipp.* 1.19).<sup>15</sup> Men who hunt wild beasts win praise because they go against creatures hostile

<sup>10</sup> On the ramifications of this passage, see W. E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian* (Albany, 1977), 17.

<sup>11</sup> See in general Herman (n. 9); on Xenophon in particular, *ibid.*, 14–15, 47, 98ff., 119–20, 125, 129.

<sup>12</sup> The reasons for this must lie in Xenophon's own social assumptions and political beliefs and his personal experience of politics at Athens and elsewhere. But any full investigation, though doubtless rewarding, lies far beyond the scope of the present study.

<sup>13</sup> For a somewhat different interpretation of this passage, see Higgins (n. 10), 28.

<sup>14</sup> See L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford, 1986), 58–9, who rightly insists that here the views of Socrates and Xenophon surely coincide.

<sup>15</sup> It was perhaps desirable to emphasize the civic consciousness of cavalry officers and men, since cavalry service was commonly perceived as a soft option for the rich and aristocratic. See J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989), 204.

to the whole city: such men will be good to their parents, their whole city, and each and every one of their friends and fellow-citizens (*Cyn.* 13.12, 17).<sup>16</sup> Among particular examples Xenophon cites Ischomachus, who delights in honouring the gods, helping his friends when they are in need, and adorning the city as best he can (*Oec.* 11.9, cf. 8). He himself thought that he would acquire greater honour among his friends and a greater name in the city if he succeeded in doing the army some good (*A.* 6.1.20, cf. his prayer at 26).

That conventional democratic wisdom might look askance at the degree of latitude Xenophon allows to the individual's desire for recognition is underlined by the fact that the most famous figure who claims to strike a balance between personal ambition and patriotism is Alcibiades, who asserts that the qualities for which he is notorious admittedly bring glory to himself and his ancestors but also enhance his country. His personal display at Olympia gives foreigners an impression of the greatness of the city, as do his splendid liturgies at home. So at his own expense he benefits not only himself but the city (*Thuc.* 6.16.1ff.).<sup>17</sup>

Xenophon also provides several examples of the isolation of supposed bad citizens who have allegedly harmed the city. The most notorious, of course, is Socrates, against whom the charge was brought that he did not believe in those gods that the city believed in (*M.* 1.1.1, cf. 2, *Ap.* 10–11). But more revealing is a less serious occasion when Socrates was commendably but irritatingly different from other men. During the siege of Athens, when others were sunk in self-pity, he behaved just as he had done when the city was at the height of its prosperity (*Ap.* 18). It is all too easy to see how he might have been accused of not sympathizing with the misfortunes of the people.

Under oligarchy the interests of the ruling few naturally prevail, but the demand for solidarity is no less strong. Throughout his prosecution of Theramenes, Critias stresses both the isolation of Theramenes and the unity of outlook between the rest of the Thirty and the *boule* (*H.* 2.3.27ff.). Theramenes indeed agrees that if any man wants to overthrow the rule of the Thirty and strengthen those who are plotting against it he deserves the harshest punishment (*H.* 2.3.37). But later in his defence he gives pride of place to the city. Under the Four Hundred, he says, it was not he who was guilty of treason, but those who wanted to let in the Spartans so that the city would be subject to them and their companions (*H.* 2.3.46). To a democrat the interests of the oligarchy and the city were, of course, diametrically opposed. After the death of Critias, Cleocritus appealed for the rejection of the Thirty, who for their own profit in only eight months had killed almost as many Athenians as the Peloponnesians had done in ten years of war (*H.* 2.4.21).<sup>18</sup>

Xenophon himself asks the army to consider what the 'self-appointed generals' have done for it: by stoning the envoys they have brought it about that for the Ten Thousand alone of all the Greeks it is not safe to enter Cerasus (*A.* 5.7.29–30). The *Anabasis* also offers an example of one of the most drastic forms of isolation, the denial that a man is a citizen at all, or even a Greek. Apollonides, according to Xenophon, brought shame on his country and all Greece by being the man he was, being a Greek, whereupon Agasias riposted that he was no part of Boeotia or of Greece—he had the pierced ears of a Lydian (*A.* 3.1.30–1).

The ultimate isolation is that of the tyrant, who, says Hiero, can take no pleasure in

<sup>16</sup> That the value of the hunting ethos to the city is ideological rather than strictly practical is rightly stressed by S. Johnstone, *CPh* 89 (1994), 228–9.

<sup>17</sup> See R. Seager, *Historia* 16 (1967), 8; Ober (n. 15), 226ff., 251ff.

<sup>18</sup> On Cleocritus' speech, see Dillery (n. 4), 157–8.

seeing the citizens brave and well-armed, but is forced to prefer a situation in which foreigners inspire more awe than citizens. Nor can he rejoice when there is a surplus of good things, for he knows that want will keep his subjects weak (*Hier.* 5.3–4).

The democracy demanded from the individual not merely solidarity but subordination: absolute obedience to the people, its institutions, and its appointed representatives, and unquestioning acknowledgement of the priority of the city's interests over his own and those of his family and friends.<sup>19</sup>

Characters in Xenophon duly conform. At the Arginusae trial Euryptolemus insists that it would be disgraceful for him to care more about Pericles, just because he is a relative, than about the whole city (*H.* 1.7.21). Agesilaus treats the subordination of friendship as a fundamental principle. Among the Greek cities, he tells Pharnabazus, men become *xenoi*, but if their cities go to war, then *xenoi* fight against *xenoi* and sometimes even kill one another (*H.* 4.1.34). Critias admires the Spartan attitude in the matter of respect for authority. If one of the ephors, he says, criticized the authorities and opposed their policies without persuading the majority, he would be held to deserve the most severe punishment by the ephors themselves and by all the rest of the city (*H.* 2.3.34).

A particular case of the general principle of the subordination of the individual to the community is the requirement that the people should keep its politicians under control. The stock image is of the people as master, the politicians as its slaves. This is, of course, the scenario of Aristophanes' *Knights*, yet despite the gulf between image and reality apparent for most of that play, Isocrates and Demosthenes look back to a supposed golden age in the fifth century when the proper relationship obtained.<sup>20</sup> Aristippus in *Memorabilia* concurs. He equates holding office with providing for the needs of the other citizens and rejects it because it is hard enough to provide for oneself. He sees no attraction in neglecting one's own concerns while running the risk of prosecution if one does not accomplish everything that the city wants. For cities, he says, treat their magistrates as I treat my slaves, expecting them to provide benefits in plenty for the city while keeping their hands out of the till (*M.* 2.1.8–9).

Spartans, perhaps predictably, excel in advertised subordination. Xenophon himself observes that at Sparta, unlike other places, the most powerful men make a point of being especially subservient to the magistrates and take pride in their own subordination, in order to set a good example to the rest (*L.P.* 8.2). Callicratidas says that, since he was sent out by the city to command the fleet, he can do nothing else but carry out its orders to the best of his ability (*H.* 1.6.5). So at Miletus he says that he is compelled to obey the magistrates at home (*H.* 1.6.8).<sup>21</sup> As always, Agesilaus stands out. When he was summoned home to help his country, he obeyed the city just as if he had been standing alone in the presence of the ephors (*Ag.* 1.36). Rather than be the greatest man in Asia, he chose to rule and be ruled at home in accordance with the law (*Ag.* 2.16).<sup>22</sup>

Individual initiative, without the sanction of the city or an authority constituted by it, is therefore dangerous. During the civil upheavals at Phlius the city fined all those who had gone to Sparta without being sent by the city (*H.* 5.3.11). But the most

<sup>19</sup> See e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 890ff.; *I.A.* 1383ff., 1528ff.; Lys. 21.19, 23; Isoc. 4.79; Dem. 20.14, 98, 23.198; Aesch. 3.183; Pl. *Rep.* 420B; Ar. *Pol.* 1337a27.

<sup>20</sup> See Isoc. 7.26–7; Dem. 3.30–1, 13.31, 23.209–10.

<sup>21</sup> For various views of these assertions, see J. L. Moles, *JHS* 114 (1994), 73–4.

<sup>22</sup> Persians too are given credit for proper subordination. In general, see C. 1.2.9, 13; on Cyrus himself in particular, see C. 1.4.25, 4.5.17.

infamous example had come earlier, when the ephors and the city at large were initially critical of Phoebidas, because the seizure of the Cadmea had not been ordered by the city, until Agesilaus urged a more pragmatic approach to the question of the city's interest, insisting that the vital issue was whether or not his actions had benefited Sparta (*H.* 5.2.32). The prosecutors of the assassins of Euphron at Sicyon stress the fact that the killers acted on their own initiative in the presence of the very authorities who should decide questions of life and death. What will become of the city, they ask, if anyone who pleases can kill a man without pleading any justification? The killers are thus impious, unjust, and lawless, and have shown the greatest contempt for the city (*H.* 7.3.6).

One of the most important ways in which the individual manifests his subordination to the city is, as several passages already cited have made clear, by obedience to the magistrates and the laws.<sup>23</sup> However, Xenophon is one of several authors conscious of possible problems concerning the relationship between law and justice. One simplistic solution is to define justice in terms of the laws. Thus justice, according to Euthydemus, is what the laws ordain (*M.* 4.6.6), a view found also for instance in Euripides and Aeschines and at least acknowledged by Aristotle.<sup>24</sup>

Xenophon's Socrates also accepts the customary distinction between monarchy and tyranny: monarchy is rule over willing subjects in accordance with laws (*M.* 4.6.12). Thus the standard to which Cyrus' father conforms among the Persians is not his own whim but the law (*C.* 1.3.18). The kings of Sparta too swear an oath to rule in accordance with the established laws of the city (*L.P.* 15.7). Indeed, it is common knowledge that obedience to the magistrates and the laws is greatest at Sparta thanks to Lysurgus, who thought up many devices to make the citizens law-abiding (*L.P.* 8.1, 5). Yet again, Agesilaus provides a shining example. Although he was the most powerful man in the city, his subservience to the laws was manifest, and he thought that if the citizens continued to obey the laws, Sparta would always flourish (*Ag.* 7.2-3).

Socrates declares that the best officers in a city are those who cause the citizens to obey the laws, while the city whose citizens are most obedient to the laws will fare best in both peace and war. Indeed, the reason concord is so highly prized is that it encourages the citizens to obey the laws, and obedience to the laws makes cities strong and prosperous (*M.* 4.4.15-16). He himself believed in doing whatever he was told by the laws. He would not bring illegal measures before the people but joined with the laws in opposing the impulses of the demos, and when the Thirty ordered him to perform an illicit act he refused, because their orders were illegal. Finally he chose to die in obedience to the laws rather than live at the cost of breaking them (*M.* 4.4.1ff.). Yet his accusers claimed that he taught his pupils to despise the established laws (*M.* 1.2.9).

In two significant instances appropriate, though vain, appeal is duly made to the laws. After Arginusae, Eurypotlemus urges the people to do nothing without the sanction of the laws which have made Athens great (*H.* 1.7.29). Theramenes asks that the law laid down by the Thirty themselves should be observed in his case and others, so that Critias may not be free to remove him and any others of the audience he pleases from the list of citizens (*H.* 2.3.52).<sup>25</sup>

The relationship between *παρανομία*, *βία*, and the laws merits further attention.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> See Seager (n. 1), 17ff., and the sources there cited.

<sup>24</sup> See Eur. *Hec.* 800-1; Aesch. 3.199; Ar. *E.N.* 1129b11, 1130a23.

<sup>25</sup> See Dillery (n. 4), 156.

<sup>26</sup> See e.g. Soph. *Ant.* 480ff.; *O.C.* 911ff.; Lys. 3.22-3; Isoc. 20.10; Dem. 21 *passim*, [Dem.] 25.27-8.

Cyrus' tutor is made to put the matter in simple terms: what is lawful is just; what is illegal is violent (*C.* 1.3.17). The envoy Autocles accuses the Spartans of imposing decarchies and triacontarchies, not caring that they should rule in accordance with the laws, but only that they should be able to hold down the cities by force (*H.* 6.3.8).

But Xenophon shows much greater subtlety in the famous dialogue between Alcibiades and Pericles. Pericles defines laws as measures approved by the mass of the people, telling men what to do and not to do, then expands this definition to accommodate other constitutions: a law is any written ordinance of the ruling power in a city, even if this be a tyrant. Alcibiades starts from a more conventional position, saying, as democrats usually do, that when a tyranny or an oligarchy imposes its will without persuasion this constitutes violence (*βία*) and lawlessness (*παρανομία*).<sup>27</sup> But then he springs his surprise question: are measures imposed by the masses on the rich without persuasion instances of *βία* or *νόμος* (*M.* 1.2.42ff.)? This is almost on a par with the elegant wit of Hippias in Plato's *Protagoras*, who makes the point that the law, which is tyrant over men, forces them to do many things against their nature (*Pl. Prot.* 337D). Here the normal antitheses between law and force, law and tyranny, are broken, while that between law and nature and the link between tyranny and force are paradoxically preserved.

Socrates himself was accused of encouraging the young to despise the established constitution and of making them violent. But in fact men engaged in philosophical pursuits know the disadvantage of violence as a means (*M.* 1.2.9–10). So Xenophon indignantly asks how Socrates, being what he was, could possibly have fostered lawlessness and similar vices in others, when he himself had been trained to cultivate moderation (*M.* 1.2.1–2).

## 2. CIVIC VIRTUES AND VICES

Apart from the instances considered above in relation to the theme of obedience to the laws, Xenophon has little to say about the common triad of corporate civic virtues—*κόσμιος*, *μέτριος*, and *σώφρων*—or the corresponding triad of vices—*παρανομία*, *ὑβρις*, and *βία*.<sup>28</sup> Most interesting is another complaint made against Socrates, which links *βία* and *ὑβρις*. Of his brightest pupils, men observed that Critias was the most dedicated to *πλεονεξία* and violence among the Thirty, while Alcibiades was the most unrestrained and arrogant of men under the democracy (*M.* 1.2.12). But even they, Xenophon insists, practised *σωφροσύνη* as long as they were under his tutelage (*M.* 1.2.17–18, cf. 26).<sup>29</sup> A couple of intriguing sidelights are cast on the theme of making oneself useful to the city with one's property and one's person.<sup>30</sup> Xenophon sees it as a justification of hunting that those who practise the sport are training themselves to be useful to their country in matters of the greatest moment (*Cyn.* 12.11). Both their persons and their property, thanks to their devotion to their sport, are kept in good condition to be put at the disposal of the community should the need arise (*Cyn.* 13.11).<sup>31</sup> He shares this perception with Euripides' Hippomedon,

<sup>27</sup> See e.g. Eur. *Hel.* 785ff., *Supp.* 450ff.; Thuc. 6.15.4; [Dem.] 17.3; Ar. *Pol.* 1311a27. For some further paradoxes, cf. Hdt. 3.81.2; Pl. *Pol.* 291E–2A; Ar. *Pol.* 1281a21.

<sup>28</sup> For the three virtues, see e.g. Lys. 7.41, 21.28; Dem. 21.128; Aesch. 3.170; Hyp. 3.21; for the three vices, see esp. [And.] 4, Lys. 3 and Dem. 21 *passim*.

<sup>29</sup> For the link between *ὑβρις* and *βία*, cf. also *H.* 5.3.12–13. For *βία* alone, cf. *M.* 2.6.24; for *παρανομία*, cf. *H.* 3.4.8.

<sup>30</sup> See Seager (n. 1), 21ff., esp. 23–4, and the sources there cited.

<sup>31</sup> The presentation of a democratic justification for an aristocratic, élitist pastime is

who engaged in hunting, riding, and archery to make himself physically capable of being useful to the city (Eur. *Supp.* 887). The standard of ability to be of greatest use with one's property and one's person was also applied by the law to service in the cavalry (*Hipp.* 1.9).

But he is far more concerned with another civic duty, that of doing what one is told, τὸ προσταττόμενον.<sup>32</sup> Some passages deal with the essential question of what constitutes a legitimate source of such an order. An anonymous interlocutor makes a fundamental point, with which Socrates seems to agree (*M.* 3.9.11): the right to give orders is an attribute of the ruling power, whatever that may be.<sup>33</sup> Sources specific to different societies and social contexts are mentioned. The Persian king may give orders to his satraps (*H.* 4.1.37); in Sparta at least, fathers may command their children (*L.P.* 6.2). But under democracy the prime source of a legitimate command is the city, which may impose diverse liturgies on its citizens in peace and war (*Oec.* 2.6, *S.* 4.30; cf *C.* 1.2.2). The degree of obedience required is implied in the envy felt by Callias for the man who is not treated as a slave at the orders of the city (*S.* 4.45).

Though isolated, Crito's complaint to Socrates that at Athens life was difficult for a man who wanted to mind his own business, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (*M.* 2.9.1), is provocative. It suggests that the notion of minding one's own business might give rise to the same ambiguous responses as the practice of ἀπραγμοσύνη and ἡσυχία, and perhaps that Xenophon would not have approved of the view on such matters ascribed by Thucydides to Pericles in the funeral speech.<sup>34</sup>

But most interesting of all are Xenophon's observations on a series of concepts potentially or actually disruptive of civic order.<sup>35</sup> First among these is φιλοτιμία, which posed a problem for democracy, given its essentially competitive and individualistic nature.<sup>36</sup> Since it could not do without it, the democracy tried with some success to harness it, by insisting that it be sought only in pursuit of objectives that benefited the city as a whole and that the city was the only legitimate source of τιμή.

As in the matter of service to the city in general, Xenophon's standpoint is significantly more traditional than the norm in the amount of leeway he allows to individual pride and ambition. For him the φιλοτιμία and courage of Agesilaus' brother Peisander are partial compensations for his inexperience and incompetence (*H.* 3.4.29). Men devoted to φιλοτιμία respond to courtesy, says Socrates to Chaerecrates (*M.* 2.3.16) and, as Socrates agrees, should be given the front rank when there are perils to be faced, for they are willing to court danger in order to win praise (*M.* 3.1.10). The risks they run may, of course, be undertaken in the service of their

noteworthy. (For the aristocratic character of hunting, see Johnstone [n.16], 227; Ober [n.15], 253.)

<sup>32</sup> See Seager (n. 1), 18–19, and the sources there cited.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Pericles' definition of a law at *M.* 1.2.42 (above, p. 391); also *Pl. Rep.* 339D–E, *Ar. Pol.* 1299a27. Xenophon does not pursue the subject of 'natural law', though at *S.* 1.11 the giving of orders is said to be characteristic of the stronger.

<sup>34</sup> On quietism in general, see Carter (n. 14). For negative attitudes to ἀπραγμοσύνη, apart from *Thuc.* 2.40.2, see e.g. *Dem.* 21.141; positive: e.g. *Arist. Eq.* 269ff., *Vesp.* 1037ff., *Isoc.* 15.4. For ἡσυχία, see e.g. (negative) *Arist. Plut.* 921–2 (by a sycophant), *Lys.* 28.7, *Isoc.* 15.33–4, *Dem.* 23.5; (positive) *Eur. fr.* 194, *Isoc.* 7.51, 15.150–1. The ambiguity inherent in the concept is brought out by *Dem.* 18.307–8.

<sup>35</sup> On Xenophon's preoccupation with order, see Dillery (n.4), 28ff.

<sup>36</sup> On φιλοτιμία, see Seager (n. 1), 23–4; D. Whitehead, *CM* 34 (1983), 55ff.; Higgins (n. 10), 36; Ober (n. 15), 243. On the general democratization of aristocratic, individualistic values, see Seager (n. 1), 21ff.; Ober (n. 15), 259ff., 291ff., 333; Mitchell (n. 9), 179ff.



country, but they win renown as individuals (*M.* 3.5.3). It is precisely this willingness to face up to hard work and danger for the sake of praise and honour that for Xenophon distinguishes the *φιλότιμος* from the *φιλοκερδής* (*Oec.* 14.10). The effort and pain need not always be those of battle: in *Symposium* Socrates cites the trials of the pancratiast as proof of *φιλοτιμία* (*S.* 8.37).<sup>37</sup>

Xenophon's Socrates sees *φιλοτιμία* as the quality in which Athenians most excel other men; it makes them keen in the pursuit of noble and honourable things (*M.* 3.3.13). He declares that he, like the city, is always enamoured of men who are good by nature and pursue virtue *φιλοτίμως* (*S.* 8.41). But another piece of information brings us abruptly down to earth and reminds us why *φιλοτιμία* might arouse suspicion. At Athens the two men most dedicated to *φιλοτιμία*, who wanted everything to be done through them and to be the most renowned of all, were Alcibiades and Critias (*M.* 1.2.14). But the quintessence of Xenophon's view is perhaps to be found in *Hiero*. *φιλοτιμία*, says Simonides, does not occur in animals, nor indeed in all men. It is those who are susceptible to the love of honour and praise who rise highest above the level of the beasts, and only they truly deserve the name of men (*Hier.* 7.3).<sup>38</sup>

Some of these passages at least hint at the disruptive potential of *φιλοτιμία*, which is clearer in the story of Xenias and Pasion, who left Cyrus' army in a huff. At first their behaviour was interpreted as an act of *φιλοτιμία*, that is of wounded pride, because Cyrus had allowed Clearchus to retain those of their men who had gone over to him when they thought that Xenias and Pasion were going to return to Greece (*A.* 1.4.7).

In all this there is no trace of the democratic emasculation of *φιλοτιμία* which is so characteristic of the orators from Lysias to Lysurgus. But Xenophon is not immune to it. In *Hipparchicus* it is said to be natural for phylarchs to feel *φιλοτιμία* at displaying the greatest number of spearmen to the city (*Hipp.* 1.21). The creation of a small foreign cavalry force is recommended as a spur to greater *φιλοτιμία* among all the cavalry (*Hipp.* 9.3). It may safely be inferred, though it is not expressly stated, that the city would be both judge and beneficiary of such competition. The association of *φιλοτιμία* with subordination is strongest in the suggestion that metics too might show *φιλοτιμία* on cavalry service, for when the citizens allow them a share in honourable pursuits, some are ready to do what they are told *φιλοτίμως* (*Hipp.* 9.6).<sup>39</sup>

The subjection of *φιλοτιμία* to the authority of the state is advantageous to the government not only under democracy but also in other constitutions. Callicratidas takes pride in his obedience to orders, even when Sparta is criticized for its actions (*H.* 1.6.5).<sup>40</sup> No democrat could find fault, *mutatis mutandis*, with the attitude of Pharnabazus, who tells Agesilaus that for him it is a ground for *φιλοτιμία* to receive his command from the king (*H.* 4.1.37). Cyrus sought to inspire in his men *φιλοτιμία* towards himself by giving rewards and honours of all kinds to those who distinguished themselves at hunting (*C.* 8.1.39).<sup>41</sup>

Xenophon also offers a striking example of the limited horizons of civic *φιλοτιμία* to set against, for instance, the wide-ranging rhetoric of Demosthenes' comments on

<sup>37</sup> The *φιλοτιμία* of Cyrus follows the same pattern. Cf. *C.* 1.2.1, 1.3.3, 1.4.1, 1.5.12.

<sup>38</sup> See Carter (n. 14), 20.

<sup>39</sup> Essentially the good metic should behave in every way like the good citizen, only more so. See D. Whitehead, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Cambridge, 1977), esp. 37, 51, 58.

<sup>40</sup> See Moles (n. 23), 73–4.

<sup>41</sup> Hunting also figures in the reassuring snippet of information that even eunuchs can feel *φιλοτιμία* (*C.* 7.5.63–4).

Conon's victory at Cnidus.<sup>42</sup> Epaminondas, he says, thought that if he won at Mantinea he would totally destroy the coalition that had formed against Thebes, while if he were killed it would at least be glorious to die in the attempt to leave his country dominion over the Peloponnese. For that is the way men devoted to *φιλοτιμία* think (*H.* 7.5.18–19). Selfless service to the selfish interests of one's own city: that is the rule. But here again Xenophon takes into account the glory of the individual in a manner foreign to the practice of the orators.

Xenophon is also aware of another commonly perceived threat to democracy, an excess of individual *δύναμις*, power, or influence.<sup>43</sup> He notes that because of his influence in the city and among the allies, Alcibiades was cultivated by many men who were themselves powerful and admired by the *demos*. This caused him, like Critias, to become puffed up and led him far from the precepts of Socrates (*M.* 1.2.24–5). There is no hint of any inclination to invest the *δύναμις* of Alcibiades with glamour, as Isocrates does in his defence of the great man's son (*Isoc.* 16.40). But Xenophon puts into the mouths of Alcibiades' friends an original defence: that he had used his power solely for the good of the community. They claimed that he had been plotted against by men whose power was less than his own but whose political activities were directed solely towards their own profit, whereas he had always benefited the community both from his own resources and those of the city (*H.* 1.4.13).<sup>44</sup>

*πλεονεξία* too occupies a prominent place. Like others, Xenophon associates it with absolute rule.<sup>45</sup> To believe that one should have more than all the rest, Cyrus is told by his mother, is characteristic of the tyrant (*C.* 1.3.18). So Cambyses warns him that he should not try to rule the Persians, like other peoples, in the interest of his own *πλεονεξία* (*C.* 8.5.24). Among Athenians it is perhaps not surprising that Critias, labelled the most self-seeking and violent member of the Thirty (*M.* 1.2.12), is credited with the belief that those who wish to exercise *πλεονεξία* should not hesitate to liquidate all those who might stand in their way (*H.* 2.3.16). So the massacre of the Eleusinians and the manner in which Critias put the decision through were pleasing to those of the citizens whose only concern was their own advantage (*H.* 2.4.10). He himself attacks Theramenes in more archaic terms, accusing him of constantly pursuing his own advantage, thinking nothing of honour or his friends (*H.* 2.3.33).

In the military sphere Xenophon himself admits to punishing men who broke ranks in order to plunder and so get more booty than their fellow-soldiers (*A.* 5.8.13). His Cyrus is scathing about those who are bad at sharing labours yet keen and shameless in *πλεονεξία*, so that they are often able to gain an advantage through their wickedness (*C.* 2.2.25).

Nevertheless certain forms of *πλεονεξία* are sometimes defended. Alcibiades' friends put forward the somewhat risky argument that such a man had no need to foment revolution, since of its own free will the *demos* gave him the advantage over his contemporaries and put him on equal terms with his elders (*H.* 1.4.16). Cyrus, in realistic mood, argues that men will not practise any form of *ἀρετή* without expecting that the good will gain some advantage over the bad (*C.* 1.5.9). When asked if he thinks that the mass of the army would vote that the bravest should get the lion's share of gifts and honours, he insists that the man who has done the most good to the

<sup>42</sup> Dem. 20.69, where Conon's 'liberation' of the allies brings *φιλοτιμία* to him among the Athenians and to Athens among the Greeks at large.

<sup>43</sup> See e.g. *Lys.* 12.76, 14.35, [And.] 4 *passim*, *Aesch.* 3.145, *Hyp.* 4.1, *Din.* 1.5ff.

<sup>44</sup> For the judgement on Alcibiades' enemies, see Thucydides' comment on the political successors of Pericles (*Thuc.* 2.65.7).

community should get the biggest rewards, and expresses the conviction that it is good for the bad to see good men get the advantage (*C.* 2.2.20). So Xenophon himself says that those who pursue *πλεονεξία* in public and private life should not be resented, because such drives constitute a stimulus to virtue (*Cyn.* 13.10). He qualifies this, however, by remarking that those who want to gain an advantage in the affairs of the city must defeat their friends, whereas huntsmen are trained to defeat the common enemy (*Cyn.* 13.15). This not only shows an awareness of democracy's desire to tame and harness *πλεονεξία* in much the same way as *φιλοτιμία*, but also perhaps suggests that Xenophon was not at ease with all its consequences.

Finally, doing what one likes. The philosophers assert that under a democracy individual citizens are free to do what they like (*Pl. Rep.* 557B, *Ar. Pol.* 1310a31). The truth is very different. For an individual to do what he likes is almost always wrong, except in certain specific and clearly defined circumstances, and usually illegal.<sup>45</sup>

Doing what one likes frequently connotes the absence of some form of control or constraint which might normally be expected to operate, while the inability to do what one likes may be evidence of the operation of some overmastering force, as when Cyrus asks why, if one can choose to fall in love, one cannot stop whenever one likes (*C.* 5.1.12).

Several instances concern the Thirty. It was their constant ambition to do whatever they liked, and as soon as they were established in power they began to consider how they might achieve this (*H.* 2.3.13). At this point the possibility of constitutional restraints may still have been uppermost in their minds. But when it is said that, once they had acquired a Spartan garrison and disarmed the masses, they felt that they could now do what they liked, freedom from the risk of physical opposition seems to be in point (*H.* 2.3.21). It was certainly the danger of practical opposition on his part that led the Thirty to plot the downfall of Theramenes: when he refused to pick a victim, despite complete freedom of choice, the others thought that he would stand in the way of their doing what they liked (*H.* 2.3.22–3).

Sometimes a practical check may apply only to a certain class of people. Hiero laments the fact that ordinary men can go wherever they please without fear of death, unless their city is at war, but for tyrants every place is always enemy territory (*Hier.* 2.8). Or a certain class or individual may be exempt. It is possible, says Socrates, to teach a woman what one likes (*S.* 2.9); the point is that there are no natural restrictions on her capacity for learning. Eager to persuade Cyrus to remain with him, Astyages grants him a special privilege: for him access to the king's presence will not be controlled by Sacas; he can approach whenever he likes (*C.* 1.3.14). Nor need a check apply only to human beings. A horse should not be led in a manner that gives the man little control while leaving the animal free to do what it likes (*R.E.* 6.4).<sup>47</sup>

Military discipline is the control in question when Xenophon warns the Ten Thousand that, if that discipline is undermined, the army as a whole (here regarded as equivalent to a city) will not be able to make war or peace with whomever it likes, whereas an individual will be able to lead a force against any target he pleases (*A.* 5.7.27).<sup>48</sup> At Xenophon's suggestion, Agasias submitted himself to Cleander to do

<sup>45</sup> See e.g. Anon. *Iamb.* 7.13, Eur. *Phoen.* 549ff., *Pl. Symp.* 182D.

<sup>46</sup> See Seager (n. 1), 18, and the sources there cited.

<sup>47</sup> Verging on the ludicrous is the reference to a nose of a shape that does not obstruct the vision but allows the eyes to see whatever they like (*S.* 5.6).

<sup>48</sup> For the Ten Thousand as a polis and the limitations of the analogy (above all the absence of laws), see Anderson (n. 3), 120ff.; Dillery (n. 4), 65ff., 70, 77ff.; Higgins (n. 10), 89; G. B. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand* (Leiden, 1967), 24–5, 74–5, 150, 165.

with as he liked (*A.* 6.6.18). Xenophon later explains to Cleander that the army has agreed that he should decide as he likes not only concerning Agasias and Dexippus but also concerning itself (*A.* 6.6.31). Thus the army, again acting as a city, has deliberately ceded to Cleander the power that would naturally belong only to itself. In a democracy the ruling power is the people, and it is therefore only natural and proper that the people, as opposed to the individual citizen, should have the right to do what it likes ([*Dem.*] 59.88). This principle was abused during the Arginusae debate. When Callixenus was accused of making an illegal proposal, some in the assembly agreed, but the mass of the people cried out that it was a terrible thing if the demos was not to be allowed to do whatever it liked (*H.* 1.7.12). Later in the discussion Euryptolemus concedes that the people may punish the guilty with whatever penalty it likes (*H.* 1.7.19). Even if it judges in accordance with the law, it can still put to death or set free whomever it pleases (*H.* 1.7.26).

At Sparta the ephors have the right to fine whomever they like; they do not allow even magistrates to spend their year of office as they like before calling them to account, but punish all offences on the spot (*L.P.* 8.4). The passage highlights both the constitutional power granted to the ephors and by implication that enjoyed by magistrates in most other cities.

The formula is also used to indicate total submission to other forms of authority. For an individual it may betoken putting himself at the mercy of a jury.<sup>49</sup> So one of the assassins of Euphron at Sicyon remarks that a man cannot look down on his judges when he knows that they have the power to treat him as they like (*H.* 7.3.7).

Xenophon also furnishes a couple of examples of the common antithesis between doing what one likes and observance of the laws.<sup>50</sup> In *Memorabilia* Euthydemus' question 'Can men do whatever they like?' receives from Socrates the answer 'No, there are νόμιμα they must observe in their dealings with each other' (*M.* 4.6.5). Theramenes in his defence asks that it should not be in Critias' power to remove from the list of citizens his name or that of anyone else he pleases, but that instead the law which the Thirty themselves had made should be upheld (*H.* 2.3.52).

### 3. CONCLUSION

To conclude briefly, subjectively, and speculatively. Xenophon talks a lot about Sparta. Too much should not be made of this. Our sources as a whole are overwhelmingly Athenocentric, but, as was noted in the preamble to this paper, a great deal of what is said about Athenian democracy can be and often is applied to other cities, including Sparta, and other types of constitution. Nevertheless, it is at least possible that Xenophon, the (qualified) admirer of Sparta, was not averse to pointing out that Sparta sometimes provided a better exemplar than Athens of those values that Athenian democrats claimed to prize.

Two other factors make Xenophon stand out from the herd of democratic propagandists. First, his awareness, already noted, of the traditional claims and aspirations of individual citizens and his readiness to acknowledge that these had a right to be heard, not indeed instead of, but at least as well as those of the people and the city.<sup>51</sup> Second, the predominance in his works of themes concerned with discipline and order

<sup>49</sup> See e.g. *Ant.* 5.90, *And.* 1.26, *Lys.* 7.40, *Hyp.* 3.21.

<sup>50</sup> See e.g. *Lys.* 14.11, 22.5, *Isoc.* 8.102–3, *Dem.* 24.47, [*Dem.*] 25.20, 26.13, *Aesch.* 1.34.

<sup>51</sup> See above, pp. 387–8, 392–3, 394–5.

and of qualities deemed likely to maintain or undermine that order.<sup>52</sup> These themes also tend to cluster around individuals who, whether rightly or wrongly in Xenophon's view, were or might be seen as a threat to some aspect of the established order (Socrates, Alcibiades, Critias, Agesilaus) and events in which the established order was subjected to a high degree of stress and sometimes succumbed (the Arginusae trial, the trials of Theramenes and Socrates, and so on). It is perhaps not fanciful to suggest that these matters were close to the heart of Xenophon, laconophile and military man.

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<sup>52</sup> See above, pp. 389–90, 392, 395–6.